达利欧：狭路相逢，得霍尔木兹海峡者胜

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Mar 31, 2026

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当前的伊朗战争关键在于谁控制霍尔木兹海峡，若伊朗继续掌控，将被视为美国的失败，影响全球经济和美国的国际地位。战争的结果可能重塑国际秩序，且美国需展现军事和金融实力以维持信任。最终的对抗将影响全球贸易流和地缘政治关系，尤其是与中国、俄罗斯等国的互动。历史经验表明，帝国的衰落往往与关键贸易通道的控制权相关，未来局势需密切关注这些变化。

It All Comes Down to Who Controls the Strait of Hormuz: The “Final Battle"

狭路相逢，得霍尔木兹海峡者胜

Ray Dalio

2026年3月16日

Comparing what is now happening with what has happened in analogous historical situations and triangulating my thinking with smart, well-informed leaders and experts has always helped me make better decisions. I have found that most wars are filled with big disagreements about what is likely to happen and big surprises. However, in the case of this Iran war, it is obvious, and there is near-universal agreement, that it all comes down to who controls the Strait of Hormuz. I hear from those who run governments, geopolitical experts, and people all over the world that if Iran is left with control over who can pass through the Strait of Hormuz, or is even left with the power to negotiate:

我常常对照历史上类似的事件研究眼下正在发生的事，也会反复与智慧高深、见多识广的领袖和专家“交叉验证”我的思路，一直以来，这让我的判断更准确、决策更高效。我发现，在绝大多数战争期间，大众对“接下来会发生什么”往往分歧巨大，而且战争期间总会发生一连串始料未及的突发事件。然而，这一次“美以袭击伊朗”的战事却不一样，大家几乎没有争议，都认为关键因素只有一个，就是看谁能控制霍尔木兹海峡。我从各国决策圈、地缘政治专家，以及来自世界各地的朋友那里，不断听到同一种说法：只要伊朗还拥有“谁能通过霍尔木兹海峡”的决定权，甚至哪怕伊朗还有拿这件事讨价还价的筹码，那么：

1. The United States will be judged to have lost the war, and Iran will be judged to have won. That is because Iran controlling the Strait of Hormuz to use as a weapon would be a clear demonstration that the U.S. does not have the power to fix this situation. The consequences of allowing Iran to shut down the most important strait in the world, through which the right of passage must be ensured at all costs, would be hugely damaging to the United States, its allies in the region (especially its Gulf allies), countries that depend most on its oil flow, the world economy, and the world order. If Donald Trump and the U.S. don't win this war—with victory being easily measured by whether they can ensure safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz—they also will be perceived to have caused a disastrous situation they could not fix. Whatever the reason that the United States doesn't win control of Hormuz—whether it is because anti-war politics threaten President Trump's political control ahead of the upcoming mid-term elections and he is afraid of that, because of his and the American electorate's lack of willingness to suffer the losses of lives and money required to win this war, because the U.S. doesn't have the military power to get and maintain control, or because he cannot bring together other countries in a consortium to keep this strait open —it doesn’t matter. President Trump and the U.S. will have lost.

1. 在大家心中，这场战争就是伊朗获胜，而美国输了。原因在于：只要伊朗还把霍尔木兹海峡握在手里、能随时拿它当武器用，那就等于在全世界面前证明，美国没有把局面“收拾干净”的实力。霍尔木兹海峡是全球最关键的海峡，无论如何都要保障这条海峡畅通无阻。如果伊朗仍有能力随时关闭霍尔木兹海峡，必然会对美国、美国的中东盟友（尤其是海湾盟友）、最依赖海湾石油出口的国家、全球经济乃至世界秩序，造成极其沉重的打击。若特朗普和他的美国政府没能赢下这场战争，没有“显而易见”地保障霍尔木兹海峡安全通航，那么他们就是在全世界眼皮子底下，自己制造了战火和灾难，却没办法自己收场。美国为什么还没夺取霍尔木兹的控制权？可能是因为美国国内反战浪潮高涨，特朗普害怕在中期选举中失去对国会立法权的掌控（注）；可能是是因为特朗普本人和美国选民都不愿意为了这场战争牺牲美军生命和耗费美国财富；可能是因为美国现有军事实力根本不足以夺取海峡并长期防守控制；又或者因为特朗普没办法说服其他国家与美国联盟，一起维持海峡通航。但是，不管原因是什么，结论很明显：只要没有控制霍尔木兹海峡，特朗普和美国就是输了。

译者注：美国实行所谓“三权分立”，即总统班子的行政权，国会（参众两院）的立法权，联邦法院的司法权。特朗普善于使用总统行政令越过国会立法程序强推政策（好用爱用），天然掌控行政权；共和党（特朗普MAGA党）同时控制参众两院多数席位，许多政策只需党内协调即可通过，无需向反对党妥协，使特朗普在立法权上拥有巨大优势；特朗普在第一任期任命了3名保守派大法官，使最高法院形成6:3的保守派绝对多数，在选举干预、移民限制等案件中明显偏向特朗普。特朗普目前是“唯我独尊”的局面，立法、司法机构对行政权的制衡能力被严重削弱，可以说是“万岁总统”。中期选举会改选国会席位（众议院全部席位、参议院部分席位），如果共和党失败，失去国会两院多数席位，特朗普在立法权上的掌控力就会丢失，黄四郎的一条好腿就断了。因此接下来的中期选举对特朗普至关重要。

My reading of history and sense of what is now happening leads me to believe that if the U.S. were to lose in this way, there would be a significant risk that losing control of Hormuz would be for the United States what the Suez Canal Crisis was for Great Britain (in 1956) and analogous defeats were for the Dutch Empire in the 18th century and the Spanish empire in the 17th century. The pattern of events that leads to the breakdown of empires is almost always the same. While it is covered much more comprehensively in my book Principles for Dealing with the Changing World Order, I can tell you here that there are innumerable cases in which a perceived lesser power challenges the leading world power over the control of a critical trade route (e.g., Great Britain's control of the Suez Canal being challenged by Egypt). In these cases, the dominant power (e.g., Great Britain) threatens the lesser power (e.g., Egypt) to open the route, and everyone watches and shifts their approaches to these countries and where their money goes based on what happens. This decisive "final battle" that determines the winners and the losers and whether the empire survives or falls reshapes history because people and financial flows quickly and naturally run from the losers. These shifts affect markets, especially the debt, currency, and gold markets, and geopolitical power. Seeing so many analogous cases led me to the following principle: * When the world's dominant power that has the world's reserve currency is overextended financially, and it reveals its weakness by losing both military and financial control, watch out for allies and creditors losing confidence, the loss of its reserve currency status, the selling of its debt assets, and the weakening of its currency, especially relative to gold.

借古鉴今，我越来越笃信：如果美国真的以这种方式输掉这场战争，那么今天的“霍尔木兹海峡危机”之于美国，很可能就像 1956 年苏伊士运河危机之于大英帝国，18 世纪“第四次英荷战争”失败之于荷兰帝国、17 世纪罗克鲁瓦战役惨败之于西班牙帝国，成为强大帝国走向衰败的转折点。导致帝国走向衰败崩解的历史事件，几乎是一个模子里刻出来的。虽然我在《原则：应对变化中的世界秩序》里做了系统阐述，但我还是想在本文重申：类似的历史案例简直数不胜数，通常是一个显而易见的弱国，在关键贸易通道的控制权上，公开挑战当时的世界头号霸主（比如当时埃及挑战英国对苏伊士运河的控制）。在对峙中，霸主（英国）威胁弱国（埃及）开放贸易通道；于是，世界各国密切关注事态发展，随机应变地调整自己对两边的态度和立场，调整资金要往哪里押。决定鹿死谁手、帝国延续还是崩塌的“终极决战”，必然会重塑历史走向，因为无论是人心还和金钱，都会天然地、迅速地远离输家，所谓“树倒猢狲散”。这种趋势会直接冲击市场，尤其是债券、汇率与黄金市场，同时也会重塑地缘政治力量格局。正是因为看过太多这样的历史事件，我才提炼出下面这条原则：* 一个掌控国际储备货币的头号强国，如果在财政上过分负债、透支过度，又在军事与金融上失去控制地位，暴露出虚弱疲态，就要格外小心：盟友和债权人会对它失去信心，国际储备货币地位会动摇，债务资产会遭到抛售，本国货币会疲软，尤其是对黄金走弱（体现为本币计价的黄金价格走高）。

Because people, countries, and financial flows quickly and naturally flock to the winner, if the U.S and President Trump don't get control of the flow of traffic through Hormuz, it will threaten American power in the world and the existing world order. While it was always assumed that the U.S. would be the dominant power and could win militarily and financially over its opponents (and certainly over its middling-power opponents), the cumulative effect of the military, financial, and geopolitical consequences of the wars in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, and perhaps this war with Iran, are not good for the United States and the sustainability of the post-1945, American-led world order.

因为人心、国家立场与资本流向，都会自发迅速地向赢家靠拢；所以如果美国和特朗普无法夺取霍尔木兹海峡的控制权，无法保障航运通行，那么受到威胁的，就是美国的全球霸权和既有的世界秩序。过去，全世界都默认，美国作为头号强国，必然军事上打得赢，金融上也耗得起，所向披靡（那些“中等强国”更加不在话下）。但越南战争、阿富汗战争、伊拉克战争，再加上如今这场伊朗战争，在军事、财政与地缘政治上产生的后果，历历在目，深入人心，不仅让美国的形象日薄西山，也不断侵蚀着 1945 年战后那套“美国主导的世界秩序”。

Conversely, *when the world's dominant power demonstrates its military and financial strength, that bolsters confidence in it and the willingness to hold its debt and currency. When President Reagan got the hostages in Iran released immediately after his election and then, when Iran attacked Gulf shipping during the Iran-Iraq War, President Reagan ordered U.S. Navy escorts for oil tankers, he demonstrated his and the United States' power over Iran. If President Trump demonstrates his and the U.S.'s power to do what he said he would do, which is win this war by having free passage through the Strait of Hormuz and eliminating Iran as a threat to its neighbors and the world, it will greatly bolster confidence in his and the U.S.’s power.

反过来，* 如果世界头号强国能展示出自己的军事与金融实力，那外界对它的信心就会随之抬升，也就更愿意继续持有它的国债与货币。回顾历史，里根总统刚刚当选，就迅速解救了在伊朗被挟持的人质；随后两伊战争期间，伊朗袭击海湾航运，里根下令美国海军为油轮提供护航，这些动作都在向伊朗展示：里根和美国有实力压过伊朗一头。同理，如果特朗普能兑现自己的承诺，“确保霍尔木兹海峡自由通航、并消除伊朗对周边国家地区与世界的威胁”，赢下这场战争，那么外界对特朗普及美国实力的信心，也会被大幅拉升。

2. If, on the other hand, the Strait of Hormuz is left in the hands of the Iranians to use as a weapon to threaten American allies in the Gulf and the world economy more broadly, everyone will be hostage to the Iranians, and Donald Trump will be perceived to have picked a fight and lost. He will have left U.S. allies in the region with a huge problem, and he will lose credibility, especially given what he has said. For example, Trump has said: “If for any reason mines were placed, and they are not removed forthwith, the military consequences to Iran will be at a level never seen before,” “we will take out easily destroyable targets that will make it virtually impossible for Iran to ever be built back, as a nation, again — Death, Fire, and Fury will reign upon them,” “the new leader in Iran will have to obtain our approval; otherwise, he will not last long.” I often hear senior policymakers in other countries say in private things like, “He talks a good game, but can he fight and win when the going gets tough?” Some observers are anticipating this fight like the Romans in the Colosseum or sports fans awaiting the final and greatest contests. President Trump is now calling on other countries to join the U.S. in ensuring the free passage through the Strait; his ability to get them to do so will be indicative of his ability to form alliances and muster power, so that would be a big win.

2. 但是，如果霍尔木兹海峡仍在伊朗手里，伊朗还能利用它威胁海湾地区的美国盟友、乃至更广意的全球经济，那么所有人都会变成伊朗的“人质”。届时，外界会认为：特朗普先动手挑起了冲突，却打输了，玩砸了。美国的中东盟友要自己收拾一堆烂摊子；特朗普呢，前几天说过多狠的话，现在就要现多大的眼，信誉值受到暴击。比如，特朗普曾经放话：“要是（伊朗）胆敢（在霍尔木兹海峡）布设水雷，不把水雷马上清除干净，那伊朗就要面对史无前例的军事后果”；“我们会轻而易举地摧毁目标，让伊朗这个国家失去重建的可能，死亡、烈焰与怒火将排山倒海倾泻而至”；“伊朗的新领导人必须得到我们的批准，否则指日可die。”我常听到别国的高层决策者私下嘀咕：“特朗普嘴炮打得响，可真要打硬仗，他打得动、打得赢吗？”还有不少旁观者甚至把这场对决当成罗马斗兽场里的压轴戏，像观众一样等着看精彩的总决赛。此刻，特朗普正呼吁其他国家与美国一道，确保霍尔木兹海峡能自由通行；他能不能拉这些国家下场，本身就是对他“组建联盟、集结力量”能力的一次公开测验。如果他真能做到，那当然会是一场大胜。

It will be very difficult for the United States and Israel alone to ensure the safe passage of ships without prying Hormuz loose from Iranian control, and it will likely require a great battle to do so. The outcome is existential for the Iranian leaders and the largest and most powerful segment of Iran’s population. To the Iranians, this war is very much about revenge and commitment to what matters more than life. They are willing to die as a demonstrated willingness to die is essential for one's self-respect and showing the devotion that brings about the greatest reward—while Americans are worrying about high gas prices and America’s leaders are worrying about midterm elections. * In war, one’s ability to withstand pain is even more important than one’s ability to inflict pain. The Iranians' plan is to try to drag the war out and steadily intensify it because it is widely known that the American public, and therefore American leaders, have very limited capacities for pain and wars that drag on. So, if this war is made painful enough and long enough, the Americans will abandon the fight and their Gulf "allies," and other "allies" around the world, will see that the United States will not be there to protect them. This will undermine the relationships with aligned countries in analogous situations.

如果不把霍尔木兹海峡从伊朗手里“撬出来”，美国和以色列想靠一己之力保障船只安全通行，必然难上加难；真要做到，打一场硬仗就在所难免。对伊朗的领导层以及伊朗庞大的权势阶级来说，这场战争，事关生死存亡。对伊朗百姓而言，这场战争很大程度上是复仇战，关乎他们“重于泰山”的信念和信仰。他们愿意为此赴死捐躯，因为“敢牺牲”本身就是自尊的底线，慷慨赴死能换来无上荣耀，而与此同时，美国百姓却在担心飙升的油价，美国的决策者在担心中期选举。* 在战争中，忍辱负重不畏苦难，比心狠手辣更重要。伊朗的计划很清楚：尽可能把战争拖下去、并一步步升级烈度，因为众所周知，美国人民（因此也导致美国领导层）对“苦痛”的耐受上限很低，更受不了持久战。所以，只要把这场仗打得足够痛、打得足够久，美国人迟早会退缩撤离，抛下他们在海湾的“盟友”；而世界各地的其他“盟友”也会看得一清二楚：在关键时刻，美国不会保护他们的。这会从根本上削弱美国与同路国家之间的盟友关系。

3. While there is talk of ending this war with an agreement, everyone knows that no agreement will resolve this war because agreements are worthless. Whatever happens next—i.e., leaving Hormuz in Iranian hands or taking control away from them—is likely to be the worst phase of the conflict. This "final battle," which will make crystal clear which side won and which side lost control, is likely to be a very big one.

3. 尽管外界议论纷纷，认为可以通过协议结束这场战争，但大家心里都清楚：靠协议结束不了这场战争，因为协议一文不值。接下来无论走势如何，不论是伊朗继续把霍尔木兹海峡攥在手里，还是美国从伊朗手里夺走控制权，都会是这场冲突最凶险的阶段。因为这场“终局之战”之后，谁赢得控制权、谁失去控制权，会清楚得不由分说，因此，这场“终局之战”将是一场恶战。

To quote Iran's military command, “All oil, economic, and energy facilities belonging to oil companies in the region that are partly owned by the United States or that cooperate with the United States will be immediately destroyed and reduced to ashes.” That will be what they attempt. If the Trump Administration is successful in its efforts to get other countries to join it in sending warships to provide safe escorts—and hasn’t already been mined—we will see if that becomes a solution. Both sides know that the final battle, which will make clear which side won and which side lost, still lies ahead. And they know that if President Trump and the United States don’t deliver on reopening the strait, it will be terrible for them. If, on the other hand, President Trump wins this final battle and eliminates the Iranian threat for at least the next several years, it will greatly impress everyone, empower President Trump, and demonstrate American power.

伊朗军方发言人说：“本地区所有由美国持股或与美国合作的石油公司名下的石油、经济与能源设施，都会被立即摧毁，化为灰烬。”这就是他们接下来要干的事。如果霍尔木兹海峡还没布设水雷封死航线，如果特朗普政府真能拉其他国家下场，一起派军舰为商船护航，能不能化解这个危机就可以拭目以待了。双方都知道，真正的“终局之战”还在后头：到时“谁赢谁输”就会摊在阳光下。双方也都明白，如果特朗普和美国没能兑现承诺，没把霍尔木兹海峡重新打通，对他们来说会非常难看。反过来，如果特朗普真能赢下这场终局之战，或者至少在未来几年把伊朗的威胁压下去，则会让所有人刮目相看：特朗普的声势会水涨船高，美国也会再次证明自己的实力。

4. The direct and indirect effects of this “final battle” will ripple around the world, affecting trade flows, capital flows, and geopolitical developments with China, Russia, North Korea, Cuba, Ukraine, Europe, India, Japan, etc. The current war, along with other recent wars, is part of the far bigger classic Big Cycle progression that has financial, political, and technological implications. These implications can be best understood by studying past analogous wars and applying the lessons learned to current circumstances. For example, * a country’s financial and military capacities to fight wars are affected by the number and severity of the wars it is fighting, its internal politics, and its relationships with countries that have shared interests (e.g., between Iran, Russia, China, and North Korea). The United States doesn't have the capacity to fight multiple wars (no country does), and in a world that is so interconnected, wars, like pandemics, spread quickly in unimaginable ways. At the same time, within countries, especially within democracies that have great wealth and values differences, there is always fighting over what should be done and who should pay how much and in what form (i.e., money, lives lost, etc.). There will almost certainly be these sorts of direct and indirect relationships and consequences that are very difficult to anticipate but won't be good.

4. 这场“终局之战”的直接影响与间接影响，会像涟漪一样扩散到全球各处：贸易流向会被改写，资本流向会重新站队，而围绕中国、俄罗斯、朝鲜、古巴、乌克兰、欧洲、印度、日本等一系列国家与地区的地缘政治演进，也会牵一发动全身。眼前这场战争，以及最近几年接连不断的其他战争，是更宏大的兴衰“大周期”里的一环，它在金融、政治与科技层面都有连锁反应。要理解这些后果，最可靠的办法，就是去找历史上相似的战争做对照，把当年总结出来的经验教训，映射到今天的处境上。比如，* 一国的财政能力与军事实力，能不能打胜仗、能打多久，很大程度上取决于它同时卷入了多少场战争、战事有多惨烈；也取决于它的国内政治环境、与“利益一致”的国家结成了怎样的关系（例如伊朗、俄罗斯、中国与朝鲜之间的关系）。美国没有能力同时打多场战争（任何国家都做不到）；而在这个高度互通互联的世界里，战争就像疫情一样，会以难以想象的方式快速外溢、蔓延。与此同时，在各国内部，尤其是在财富差异巨大、价值观分裂严重的民主国家里，争吵和攻讦绵延不休，该做什么事、该谁出钱、能付出多少的代价（花多少钱、牺牲多少生命），你争我吵，没有定论。可以肯定的是，错综复杂的直接与间接关联，以及由此引发的直接与间接后果，往往极难提前预判，大概率也不会是什么好消息。

To bring this note to an end, I want to emphasize that I am not political; I am just a practical person who has to bet on what will happen and has studied history to draw lessons that help me do that well, and I am now passing along my principles and thoughts that might help others navigate these tumultuous times. As I have explained before, from studying the rises and declines of empires and their reserve currencies over the last 500 years of history, which I did to help me make my global macro bets (and which I shared in my book and YouTube video The Changing World Order), there are five big, interrelated forces that drive how monetary orders, political orders, and geopolitical orders come and go. They are: 1) the long-term debt cycle (comprehensively explained in my book How Countries Go Broke: the Big Cycle), 2) the related political cycle of order and disorder (that progresses in clearly identifiable stages and at its worst causes civil wars), 3) the related international geopolitical cycle of order and disorder (that also progresses in clearly identifiable stages and at its worst leads to devastating world wars), 4) the advancements of technologies (that can improve or destroy lives), and 5) acts of nature. What is now happening in the Middle East is just a small part of this Big Cycle at this current moment in time.

写到这里，我想强调一句：我不热心政治也没有政治立场。我只是务实的人，本职工作需要我对未来“押注”，而我研究历史，就是为了从中提炼经验教训，让自己押得更准。现在，我把凝炼的原则和想法分享出来，希望能帮更多人穿越这段动荡时期。我之前介绍过，我研究了过去 500 年里各大帝国（朝代）及其储备货币的兴衰罔替，是为了辅助我做全球宏观押注（这些内容我写进了书里，也在视频《The Changing World Order》中讲过）。通过这些研究，我得出一个结论：有五股彼此交织的力量，决定了货币秩序、政治秩序与地缘政治秩序的兴衰罔替。它们分别是：1）长期债务周期（我在新书《国家为什么会破产》里做了系统阐述）；2）与之相伴的国内政治“治乱”周期（有清晰明确的不同阶段，极端时会走向内战）；3）与之相伴的国际地缘政治“治乱”周期（同样有清晰明确的不同阶段，极端恶劣时会引爆毁灭性的世界大战）；4）技术进步（既能改善生活，也能摧毁生命）；5）大自然的力量。眼下中东正在发生的一切，只是这轮“大周期”在当下时点的一个小切面。

While it is impossible to anticipate and get all the details and specifics exactly right, it is quite easy to measure the health and the progressions of these five forces and the overall Big Cycle. The important thing for you to do is to ask yourself, is that Big Cycle progression true and are these indicators indicative of where we are in the Big Cycle—and if so, what should I do about it? I remain ready, willing, and able to explore these things with you if you’d like to ask me questions in the comments.

尽管不可能把所有细节和变量都猜中、一次性算得分毫不差，但要衡量这五股力量各自的“健康度”和演进速度，以及它们共同构成的“大周期”整体走到哪一步，其实并不难。真正该做的，是反问自己：这个大周期的推进逻辑，是不是真切的？这些指标，是不是能告诉我们当下正处于大周期的哪个阶段？如果“是”，那下一步我该怎么做？如果你愿意，欢迎在评论区提问，我愿意随时和你探讨这些问题。

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